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Two hundred sixty-nine regulated pipeline system accidents caused fatalities and/or 
injuries in the United States between 2010 and 2018, resulting in 106 fatalities and 
599 injuries requiring hospitalization.  About 84% of these serious accidents occurred 
on gas distribution systems, which primarily transport natural gas.  This study adapts 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods which are used predominantly in the 
space and nuclear industries to gas distribution systems in the U.S.  Nationwide 
system and accident data are used to evaluate natural gas distribution system risks, 
estimate how many additional resources the public would be willing to dedicate to 
reduce or eliminate these risks, and determine which improvement areas warrant 
further evaluation.  Recommendations regarding the overall PRA-based framework, 
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I began my career shortly after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident took the 
lives of seven astronauts in 2003.  With a Bachelor’s degree in Mechanical 
Engineering and very little practical experience, I moved from my hometown in 
South Florida to work at the Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans, Louisiana.  
For the next five years, I learned from some of the country’s most talented engineers, 
as we collectively worked toward reducing the risks of space flight for future 
astronauts.  While my responsibilities focused on materials testing and analysis, I 
gained some exposure to the world of risk management that stayed with me in the 
years to come. 
In 2008, my personal life led me to look for career opportunities in Denver, 
Colorado, and I found a great position with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration (PHMSA).  While there, I studied their pipeline accident data 
and learned from their pipeline accident investigators in support of various data-
driven initiatives the agency was pursuing at the time.  I was convinced that further 
analysis of available accident data could help drive significant safety improvements, 
but I did not have a strong enough background in reliability engineering to 
demonstrate the value. 
 A few years later, a position with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
motivated me and my family to move to the D.C. area.  The NRC provided many 
opportunities for me to learn more about reliability engineering, risk management, 





related intricacies and nuance in application.  I learned a great deal about these topics 
from the staff at the NRC, especially while supporting response efforts following the 
tragic events that occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in 2011. 
As my understanding and curiosity grew, I realized that I needed to look to 
academia to learn more.  In 2017, I began studying reliability engineering part-time at 
the University of Maryland with the goal of building the skills needed to inspire 
safety improvements through the application of these methods.  As my thesis project, 
I have decided to take another look at the work I attempted while studying accident 
data for PHMSA.  Now, with an additional decade of experience, related graduate-
level coursework, and the advisement of Dr. Modarres, I hope that I have laid out a 
framework that can be built upon and improved by others.  As I have recently joined 
the National Transportation Safety Board as a Pipeline Accident Investigator, I fully 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
When compared to other available transportation methods, pipelines offer a 
relatively safe alternative for transporting hazardous materials to downstream 
customers.  However, there are accidents and incidents1 associated with these pipelines 
each year, some of which impact public safety and result in significant unexpected 
costs.  About 84% of serious pipeline accidents – accidents which involve fatalities 
and/or injuries requiring hospitalization – reported to the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
(PHMSA) since 2010 have occurred on gas distribution systems (Table 1).  The costs 
associated with these accidents can be substantial, exceeding a billion dollars in some 
cases [1].  This thesis will focus on adapting the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) 
approach practiced mostly by the nuclear and space industries to the assessment of gas 
distribution systems risks.  It will provide a method for evaluating these risks, estimate 
how many additional resources the public would be willing to dedicate to reduce or 
eliminate them, and recommend areas which warrant further evaluation. 










226 (84%) 26 (10%) 16 (6%)  1      (<1%) 269 
Fatalities 72  (68%) 24 (23%) 10 (9%) 0      (0%) 106 
Injuries 471  (79%) 101 (17%) 26 (4%) 0      (0%) 599 
 
1 There are various definitions of the terms “accident” and “incident” associated with the 
transportation of hazardous materials by pipeline.  The term “accident” will be used throughout this paper 





Section 1.1:  Background 
Natural gas pipeline technology has evolved since the Chinese introduced it in 
900 BC.  At that time, the Chinese used bamboo tubes to transport natural gas over short 
distances to supply heat and light [3].  The first commercial use of natural gas occurred in 
1802 when the Scottish engineer William Murdoch transported gas to the James Watt 
factory for lighting.  Four years later, in 1806, the first gas mains ever laid in a public 
street were manufactured from sheet lead and installed in London, England.  The first city 
in the U.S. to install gas pipelines was Baltimore, Maryland in 1817 [4].  Significant 
technological advancements have taken place since this time, improving materials, design 
and construction methods, data management, and measurement techniques.  World War 
II brought advances in metallurgy, welding techniques and pipe rolling [3].  Around the 
same time, in 1945, Polyvinylchloride (PVC) plastic pipe was developed.  After World 
War II, there was accelerated growth in pipeline construction [5]. 
Most customers receive natural gas from a local distribution company (LDC), a 
utility that can either be owned by investors or local governments.  LDCs typically 
transport natural gas to households and businesses through thousands of miles of small-
diameter distribution pipelines.  The point where the natural gas is transferred from a 
transmission pipeline to the LDC is often termed the city gate.  The natural gas is 
typically depressurized, scrubbed, filtered, and odorized near the city gate.  The odorant, 
typically mercaptan, aides in the detection of natural gas, an otherwise odorless and 
colorless gas.  The natural gas is periodically compressed to ensure pipeline flow.  
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are sometimes used to 





Current methods used to model the risk of gas pipelines varies from company to 
company and sector of the industry.  Methods include the use of quantitative risk analysis 
(QRA), accident consequence analysis (ACA), and qualitative risk assessment methods 
using indices [7], [8], [9], [10], [11].  In some cases, techniques parallel those used in 
process safety management [12].  Some studies use nationwide PHMSA data to underpin 
the analysis [13].  These existing methods typically incorporate a combination of subject 
matter expert opinion and statistical analysis assumptions that are not thoroughly 
justified.  The results do not support comparison with nationwide risk acceptance criteria 
or specific risk insights needed protect against catastrophic events.  This study lays out a 
framework that would support comparison with nationwide risk acceptance criteria and 
allow for additional risk insights to be gleaned upon further development as described 
herein. 
Section 1.2:  Safety 
The safety of natural gas distribution systems has improved in the last 200 years.  
Accidents that have occurred as the industry matured have shaped both company and 
government policies.  One of the most catastrophic accidents occurred when the London 
Junior-Senior High School in New London, Texas, exploded on March 19, 1937.  The 
school board in the affluent town of New London had voted to have a plumber illegally 
tap into a residue gas line of a local oil company to save money.  The gas line connection 
leaked, filling the school’s basement with natural gas which eventually ignited, taking 
about 300 lives [14].  
The responsibility for gas pipeline safety was assigned to the DOT by statute in 





ensuring adequate protection against risks to life and property posed by pipeline 
transportation of natural gas [16], [17]. The regulations governing natural gas distribution 
systems are codified in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 190, 191, 
192, 196, and 199.  Through a partnership with PHMSA, some states assume regulatory 
and enforcement responsibility for the regulation of gas distribution systems.   
Although pipeline safety has significantly improved over the years, catastrophic 
accidents continue to occur.  In the nine years that this analysis period includes, there 
were three significant gas distribution accidents that resulted in five or more fatalities 





Chapter 2: PRA Methodology 
The safety risks presented by gas distribution systems have been a topic of 
national interest for many decades, in part due to catastrophic accidents that have 
occurred in our country’s history.  The accidents that have occurred in the recent past can 
be used to help understand current safety risks.  Risk can be defined as a measure of the 
probability and severity of adverse events.  Risk assessments often consist of answering 
the following questions [21]:  
(1) What can go wrong? 
(2) How likely is this to happen? 
(3) If it does happen, what are the consequences?   
In this study, risks associated with the nation’s current gas distribution system 
infrastructure will be identified and assessed.  Management of these risks will be 
discussed.  The risk identification phase will include system characterization and threat 
identification.  The risk assessment phase will include estimating the likelihood and 
consequences of those threats that could lead to hazard exposure, quantifying the 
associated risk, evaluating uncertainties, and analyzing the sensitivity of various 
assumptions and importance of various risk contributors.  The framework developed as 






Figure 1. Methodology Flowchart 
 
Section 2.1:  Gas Distribution System Characterization 
The natural gas distribution infrastructure in the U.S., which primarily transports 
natural gas, has evolved.  Technological advancements have led to improvements in all 
aspects of these systems (e.g., materials, design, construction and maintenance practices, 
safety requirements).  An example illustrating potential differences in the design is shown 
in Figure 2 [22].  The low-pressure distribution system (shown on the top) has various 
regulator stations that reduce the pressure of gas coming from the city gate.  Downstream 





If any regulator station fails to perform its function, all areas downstream of the regulator 
station can be over-pressurized, potentially leading to widespread catastrophic 
consequences.  The high-pressure distribution system (shown on the bottom) regulates 
pressure near each structure and has a diverse safety device, an excess flow valve, to 
protect each customer from experiencing an over-pressurization event.  In the unlikely 
event that both the excess flow valve and regulator associated with a residence fail, the 
single customer would potentially suffer consequences.  There is also a possibility that 
multiple excess flow valves or multiple regulators could fail by a common cause (e.g., 
manufacturing or construction deficiencies).  The likelihood of this occurrence is 
relatively small when diverse safety devices are used. 
In this assessment, gas distribution risks will be estimated across the nation as a 
whole.  Detailed design information is not available for all of the nation’s gas distribution 
systems that contribute to the overall risk.  However, there is information that is available 
on a nationwide basis from PHMSA’s annual reporting forms, which will be summarized 
[2].  PHMSA annual report data were summarized based on mileage, decade installed, the 
material of construction, and repairs completed in a given year using a script that was 
developed in the statistical computing language and software environment, R, to support 
this study [23].  This data, which was reported in terms of miles of main and number of 
service lines, was combined after first converting the number of service lines to miles of 
service lines based on the average service length indicated on each report.2  To establish 
 
2 Main refers to a distribution line that serves as a common source of supply for more than one service 
line.  Service line refers to a distribution line that transports gas from the main to customers as specified in 





consistent data within the reporting period, pipelines that were reported to be fabricated 
from reconditioned cast iron were included as having “Other” material. 
 
Figure 2.  Example Natural Gas Distribution System Designs.  Top:  Low-Pressure 






Section 2.2:  Threat Identification 
In order to identify threats to the system, it is necessary to answer the first 
question in the risk triplet:  What can go wrong, or what can go wrong that could lead to 
hazard exposure?  When the specific pipeline system information is known, the system 
can be evaluated to determine those threats that could result in hazard exposure.  For 
example, the natural gas distribution systems shown in Figure 2 could be evaluated by 
considering the failure of any of the various subcomponents (e.g., failure of the pipe, a 
regulator station, or an excess flow valve).  This can be done by evaluating the associated 
piping and instrumentation diagrams and identifying threats to the overall system 
performance.  For example, failure of any regulator station in the low-pressure 
distribution system shown in Figure 2 (top) in the open position, would be identified as a 
safety threat to all downstream residences.  If the regulator stations failed in the closed 
position, there could also be a safety risk associated with natural gas curtailment if the 
failure occurred during very cold weather. 
Since specific pipeline system information is not available for this nationwide 
assessment, system reliability will be modeled based on failure cause.  This is useful 
because pipeline safety programs are often established to address particular failure 
causes.  For example, One-call programs (e.g., 8-1-1) target excavation accident 
prevention, whereas, in-line inspection (ILI) assessments target prevention of accidents 
from the particular failure mechanism(s) they can detect (e.g., cracks, corrosion, dents).  
Causes and failure modes of the gas distribution pipeline need to be assessed to define 






Section 2.3:  Likelihood Determination 
The likelihood that each of the identified threats will lead to hazard exposure will 
be estimated.  To support this evaluation, those scenarios that result in a significant 
PHMSA reportable event should be considered to have led to hazard exposure.  System 
reliability will be assessed as it relates to each threat. 
Reliability typically refers to the probability that a component or system will 
function as expected for a predetermined amount of time when exposed to actual use, or 
operating, conditions.  Various functions can be used to describe the reliability of a 
system, including the cumulative distribution, probability density, reliability, and hazard 
functions.   
The cumulative distribution function (cdf) describes the probability that the 
component or system will fail before specified time, t.  The probability density function 
(pdf) describes the relative likelihood that the component or system will fail at a time, t, 
and is defined as the derivative of the cdf.  The reliability function describes the 
probability that the component or system will survive beyond time t. 
The hazard function describes the propensity to fail in the next small interval, 
given survival up to that point.  Mathematically, the hazard function is represented by: 








 (Eq. 1) 
The hazard function is important because it shows changes in the probability of failure 
over the lifetime of a component.  For large samples, a nonparametric estimate of the 









where 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) is the number of surviving components at a time, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖, and 𝑁𝑁 is the total 




 (Eq. 3) 
where 𝑁𝑁𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) is the number of failures observed in the interval (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡).  From 




 (Eq. 4) 
In Equation 4, 𝑁𝑁𝑓𝑓
(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖)
𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖)
 estimates the probability that a component will fail in the given 
interval, provided it survives up to time, ti.  Dividing by 𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡 estimates the failure rate 
(probability of failure per unit time) for interval 𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡 [24]. 
 This concept allows for the development of life tables, which are used to describe 
human mortality and life expectancy.  In this application, there are two types of life 
tables.  The first type of life table is the cohort life table, which is developed by following 
a particular birth cohort throughout their life.  This life table takes many years to develop 
and the development is sometimes not possible due to unavailable or incomplete data.  
The second type of life table is the period life table, which represents a hypothetical 
cohort that is alive during a specific period.  For example, the period life table that was 
developed for the year 2015 “assumes a hypothetic cohort that is subject throughout its 
lifetime to the age-specific death rates prevailing for the actual population in 2015” [25]. 
When the human mortality hazard rate is plotted, it illustrates how the hazard rate 
changes with age for the hypothetical cohort, decreasing very early in life, remaining 
relatively constant, and increasing later in life during the “degradation” period (Figure 3).  





A similar “hypothetical cohort” approach will be used to evaluate the hazard rate 
of gas distribution systems.  In this study, hazard rate curves (reported in the number of 
failures per mile per year) will be developed for each threat based on an analysis of 
available historical data.  If this analysis demonstrates that the hazard rate is constant, the 
exponential distribution will be used to estimate the likelihood that the threat will 
challenge the system and lead to a reportable event.  If the hazard rate is not constant for 
a particular threat, methods for addressing higher hazards at the beginning or end of life 
will be discussed. 
 
 






Section 2.4:  Consequence Analysis 
Natural gas can form an explosive mixture when combined with air in 
concentrations between 5% (the lower explosive limit, or LEL) and 15% (the upper 
explosive limit, or UEL) natural gas in the air.  In a typical gas distribution system 
accident sequence, there is the potential for very serious consequences, including 
fatalities, injuries, and extensive property damage.  It is also possible that the 
consequences are relatively minor (e.g., venting gas to the atmosphere, cost of lost 
product and repairs).  It is often convenient to model consequence scenarios using event 
tree models.  In the simplified, notional event tree shown in Figure 4, the initiating event 
is assumed to be a PHMSA reportable gas distribution accident.  If this initiating event 
occurs, there are a series of pivotal events (also called top events) that determine the 
associated consequences.  In the notional event tree shown, the pivotal events include: 
• Evacuation:  Success of this top event is defined as a timely evacuation which 
is completed prior to the gas presenting a hazard to any person whose safety 
may be compromised (e.g., ignition/explosion or asphyxiation).  The 
probability of success will depend on the specific scenario (potential 
consequences; available response time; ability to detect, diagnose, and 
appropriately evacuate).  If the scenario does not present a hazard to any 
person, success is guaranteed.   
• Protection and Response:  Success of this top event occurs when gas vents to 
atmosphere without reaching flammable concentrations (i.e., 5-15% natural 
gas in air) in the vicinity of an ignition source.  The probability of success 





source, ability to detect, diagnose, safely extinguish all ignition sources, and 
isolate the gas leak promptly).  If a leak persists, natural gas vapors may 
travel to an ignition source and flashback, potentially increasing the potential 
consequences.  
 
Figure 4.  Simple, Notional Gas Distribution Accident Event Tree (Branching 
Convention: Success Path is Up, Failure is Down) 
 
Instead of attempting to classify accident sequences based on their potential to 
result in a fatality, injury, or property damage, a single consequence measure will be 
used.  Consequences will be assessed based on the statistical value of the accident, which 
is an estimate of the amount the public would have been willing to pay to prevent the 
fatalities and injuries that occurred as a result of the accident, plus the actual cost 
incurred.  To support this portion of the analysis, a concept broadly used in regulatory 
cost-benefit analyses – the value of a statistical life (VSL) – will be used.  “The Value of 
a Statistical Life (VSL) is defined as the additional cost that individuals would be willing 
to bear for improvements in safety (that is, reductions in risks) that, in the aggregate, 
reduce the expected number of fatalities by one.  What is involved is not the valuation of 
life, but the valuation of reductions in risks” [26].  The VSL has been estimated based on 





developed.  Using this procedure, the VSL was updated from $9.6 million in 2016 and 
rounded to $10 million in 2019.  For this analysis, since injury severity information is 
generally not available, it is assumed that all reported injuries had a severity of the 
Maximum Abbreviated Injury Scale (MAIS) 3 or serious.  This corresponds to a fraction 
of VSL of 0.105 for the purposes of statistical value calculations [26]. 
The statistical value is intended to estimate the total amount that the public would 
have been “willing to pay” for safety enhancements that would have prevented a given 
accident.  The statistical value of each accident will be calculated based on the sum of: 
• additional costs that individuals would have been willing to bear for improvements in 
safety to prevent the accident (i.e., VSL), and 
• actual costs related to property damage, repairs, emergency response, clean-up, and 
lost product 
Note that the statistical value does not include costs associated with lost productivity or 
psychological consequences which can result from a major accident or evacuation. 
 
Section 2.5:  Risk Quantification 
Risk estimation is used to interpret the various contributors to risk.  Because all 
sequences will be defined to be mutually exclusive, the risk can be calculated by 
Equation 5. 
 𝑅𝑅 = ∑ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 (Eq. 5) 
where  𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is the frequency or likelihood of sequence i occurring, and 





The risk will be estimated for each threat. 
 
Section 2.6:  Uncertainty Evaluation 
Risk assessments, like all engineering analyses, involve assumptions that are 
made to support the analyses.  There are three types of epistemic uncertainty that 
typically need to be addressed directly, including completeness, parameter, and model 
uncertainty.  Completeness uncertainty is either known or unknown, but not modeled.  If 
known, it can be addressed by conservative or bounding analysis; if unknown, it can be 
addressed by the addition of safety margins or defense-in-depth.  Parameter uncertainty is 
typically propagated through the probabilistic model.  Model uncertainty occurs when 
there are multiple modeling approaches and no consensus model exists.  Model 
uncertainty can be addressed by making assumptions, determining which are important to 
the decision, and quantitatively or qualitatively justifying them [27], [28].  The 
completeness, parameter, and model uncertainty that may be important to decisions that 
involve a risk assessment of gas distribution pipeline systems will be tabulated and 
discussed. 
 
Section 2.7:  Sensitivity and Importance Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis will be performed, as needed, based on the results of the 
uncertainty evaluation.  Importance analysis will be performed to assess the relative risk 
contribution of each threat.  This is useful to understand which safety improvement areas 






Section 2.8:  Risk Acceptance 
Federal guidelines will be reviewed to determine the level of risk that is tolerable 
as it relates to gas distribution systems.  Risk acceptance thresholds are used in several 
industries.  One example is the commercial nuclear industry.  The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) has two safety goals, one that relates to the risk of prompt fatality to 
an individual and one that relates to the societal risk of cancer fatalities [29].  The safety 
goal related to individual risk is: 
Individual members of the public should be provided a level 
of protection from the consequences of nuclear power plant 
operations such that individuals bear no significant 
additional risk to life and health. 
 
This safety goal has a corresponding quantitative objective: 
 
The risk to an average individual in the vicinity of a nuclear 
power plant of prompt fatalities that might result from 
reactor accidents should not exceed one-tenth of one percent 
(0.1 percent) of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting 
from other accidents to which members of the U.S. 
population are generally exposed.  
 
A comparable framework is necessary to evaluate gas distribution system risk 
acceptability. 
 
Section 2.9:  Risk Reduction 
The estimated risk will be compared to the acceptance threshold.  If the current 
risks are not within the acceptable range, approaches to reduce these risks will be 





Chapter 3: Results 
This case study focuses on adapting PRA methods to the U.S. gas distribution 
system to help understand and manage risks.  There are some challenges with this 
application that do not exist in other industries where PRA is more widely used.  When 
contrasted with the nuclear and space industries, natural gas distribution systems:  
• traverse broad, often populated areas that are not under the direct control of the 
operator, 
• may have unknown configurations and materials of construction, especially for 
older systems, 
• have limited experience data, and 
• have not been studied as extensively with the intent of establishing the bases for 
assumptions that are needed to support a PRA 
 
Despite these challenges, the structure that PRAs offer to support risk 
management are valuable and can be applied to other technologies, including gas 
distribution systems, to further advance safety performance.  The results presented below 
show how this structure can be applied, given the currently available information. 
 
Section 3.1:  Gas Distribution System Characterization 
The current U.S. gas distribution system primarily transports natural gas.  Natural 
gas distribution systems include a network of piping that supply gas to various 
consumers.  According to data provided by PHMSA, there are over two million miles of 





The gas distribution infrastructure includes pipelines of various ages.  Distribution 
pipelines that have known ages were installed between the start of the twentieth century 
and today, but the age of some gas distribution pipelines is unknown (Figure 5).   
There are several materials that have been used to construct these pipelines, with 
the majority being from polyethylene (PE) or coated, cathodically protected (CP) steel.  
Most newly constructed gas distribution pipelines are fabricated from PE (Table 2).   
The diameter of pipelines used in gas distribution systems varies.  The majority 
have a diameter of 2-inches or less (Figure 6).   
Gas distribution operators track and report leaks that are repaired in a given year 
by leak cause (Table 3).  The repairs are considered to be associated with a “hazardous” 
leak if the operator determines that the leak requires an immediate response.  Most 
repairs are attributed to equipment failure, corrosion, or excavation damage; most 








Figure 5.  U.S. Gas Distribution Systems – Miles of Main and Service Lines by Decade 
Installed [2] 
 
Table 2.  U.S. Gas Distribution Systems – Miles of Main and Service Lines by Material 
[2] 
 2010 2018 
Polyethylene (PE) 1,201,543 1,424,057 
Steel, Cathodically Protected (CP), Coated 668,072 636,457 
Steel, Unprotected, Bare 78,826 50,307 
Steel, Unprotected, Coated 37,387 36,549 
Other 23,431 23,493 
Cast/Wrought Iron 34,807 22,952 
Steel, CP, Bare 21,058 15,936 
Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) 14,949 11,672 
Copper 13,835 9,390 
Other Plastic 3,258 4,312 
Acrylonitrile-Butadiene-Styrene (ABS) 3,595 2,957 
Ductile Iron 796 516 








Figure 6. U.S. Gas Distribution Systems – Main and Service Lines by Diameter [2] 
 
Table 3. Total Repairs and Repairs of Hazardous Leaks in 2018 [2] 








Excavation 81,464 38,240 3.64E-02 1.71E-02 
Equipment Failure 183,916 12,856 8.22E-02 5.74E-03 
Corrosion 108,439 74,925 4.84E-02 3.35E-02 
Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure 56,477 11,366 2.52E-02 5.08E-03 
Other Cause 37,692 17,437 1.68E-02 7.79E-03 
Natural Force 29,509 42,866 1.32E-02 1.91E-02 
Other Outside Force 16,274 6,950 7.27E-03 3.10E-03 
Incorrect Operation 19,641 15,124 8.77E-03 6.76E-03 
 
 
Section 3.2:  Threat Identification 
Both the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and PHMSA have 
defined gas pipeline threat categories.  ASME B31.8S, Managing System Integrity of Gas 
Pipelines: ASME Code for Pressure Piping, B31 Supplement to ASME B31.8, identifies 





Committee International (PRCI). The nine threat categories are further divided into those 
that are time-dependent, stable, and time-independent.  Time-dependent threats (internal 
and external corrosion and stress corrosion cracking) cause degradation over time and are 
addressed by using one of the integrity assessment methods (e.g., in-line inspection, 
direct assessment).  Stable threats (manufacturing-related defects, welding/fabrication 
related, equipment) are addressed through specific, often one-time evaluations (e.g., 
pressure testing).  Time-independent threats (third party/mechanical damage, incorrect 
operational procedure, weather-related and outside force) are typically not addressed by 
specific examination or evaluation but are subject to prevention measures [30].  
PHMSA’s reporting form has seven major causes (excluding “other incident cause”) that 
generally align with the ASME B31.8S threat groups and categories (Table 4).   
For the purposes of this evaluation, the major causes defined in the PHMSA 
incident reporting form (i.e., Corrosion; Natural Force Damage; Excavation Damage; 
Other Outside Force Damage; Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure; Equipment Failure; Incorrect 
Operation; and Other Incident Cause) will be treated as the gas distribution system 






Table 4.  Comparison of Gas Pipeline Threat Categories Used by ASME B31.8S and 
PHMSA [30], [31] 
  ASME B31.8S PHMSA Major Cause 
Time-Dependent 




Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure 




Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure 
[Excluding Environmental 








Excavation Damage;  
Other Outside Force Damage;  
Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure 
[Previous Damage Only] 
Incorrect Operational 
Procedure Incorrect Operation 
Weather-Related and 
Outside Force Natural Force Damage 
Not Classified Unknown Other Incident Cause: Unknown 
 
 
Section 3.3:  Likelihood Determination 
Historical data were assessed to determine the hazard rate for accidents that 
occurred between 2010-18 [1].  For decades that ended prior to 2010, the hazard rate was 
estimated based on the decade that the pipeline was installed (Table 5).  For pipelines that 
were installed in the most recent decade (2010-19), a complete dataset did not exist for 
each reporting year of interest.  In 2010, all pipelines that were installed in the current 
decade (2010-19) were 0-1 year old; in 2011, they were 0-2 years old.  Therefore, the 
data for pipelines that were installed in the current decade were analyzed yearly based on 





developed in R [5].  The overall resulting hazard curve is shown in Figure 7.  The 
contribution from each cause is shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9.  Note that some data was 
grouped in Figure 7 through Figure 9 and the data points do not directly correspond to 
those in Table 6. 
The higher hazard rate early in life was attributed to the following causes:  
excavation, other outside force, equipment, and incorrect operations.  Three of these 
causes were designated to be “time-independent,” or random, in ASME B31.8S.  The 
remaining cause was designated “stable” in ASME B31.8S.  The higher hazard at the 
beginning of life appeared to be due to increased construction activity in the vicinity of 
the new pipeline for excavation, equipment, and incorrect operation failures.  For failures 
attributed to other outside forces, increased construction activities and unexpected 
environmental conditions (e.g., water jet or electrical arcing from nearby utilities) 
explained the higher hazard early in life.  Initiatives to flatten the hazard curve early in 
life may focus on enhancing existing processes to perform new construction safely, 
expanding public outreach related to new construction projects, and developing more 
robust processes to define and design for actual in-service conditions. 
The increasing hazard rate later in life was attributed to corrosion and natural 
force failures.  Higher hazard rates towards the end of life are typically attributed to 
degradation, which explains the response for corrosion failures.  For natural force 
damage, the hazard rate may increase later in life due to less mature requirements that 
were in place at the time the system was installed (before 1950), or degradation that may 
have compromised performance during weather-related events such as cold temperatures.  





assessments for pipelines that are more than 50 years old, implementing more aggressive 
replacement schedules for pipelines with known integrity challenges, and closely 
collecting, analyzing, and addressing a broad set of performance data. 
In many industries, reliability improvements are implemented which change the 
shape of the hazard curve.  This approach may lower and flatten the hazard curve at the 
beginning and end of life, making it indistinguishable from the useful life portion of the 
curve.  For the remainder of this evaluation, it is assumed that reliability improvements 
will be pursued to improve and flatten the hazard curve.  Therefore, the average hazard 
rates will be used.  The average hazard rate is higher than it would be after improvements 
to flatten the hazard curves have been implemented but is appropriate for use at this 
point, since the improvements have not yet been made.  Systems that exhibit a constant 
hazard curve are described by an exponential distribution.  In a future probabilistic risk 
assessment, an exponential distribution can be used to describe the likelihood for the ages 
that exhibit a constant hazard rate.  Fitting the data to a parametric curve in this way 
would allow for existing off the shelf software to be used to perform a probabilistic 
analysis.  One program that is suitable for this purpose is the Systems Analysis Programs 
for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) developed by the Idaho 
National Laboratory [32]. 
The average hazard rates by PHMSA major causes and subcauses are shown in 
Table 7.  The average hazard rates show that most failures which lead to a PHMSA 
reportable accident are attributed to excavation damage or other outside forces.  When 






Table 5.  Estimated U.S. Gas Distribution Hazard Rate by Decade Installed [2] 
Decade 
Installed 









(#/mi/yr) ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 ‘17 ‘18 
2000-09 4 10 3 5 7 7 7 8 3 6.000 378,410 1.59E-05 
1990-99 8 3 6 4 3 12 12 7 11 7.333 416,669 1.76E-05 
1980-89 6 7 5 8 10 8 9 10 6 7.667 287,231 2.67E-05 
1970-79 5 6 6 7 3 10 5 9 13 7.111 237,287 3.00E-05 
1960-69 10 8 7 6 7 5 9 4 6 6.889 285,833 2.41E-05 
1950-59 8 5 5 9 7 4 3 5 3 5.444 155,036 3.51E-05 
1940-49 2 2 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 1.333 35,438 3.76E-05 
Pre-1940 1 3 4 2 5 5 5 2 5 3.556 73,901 4.81E-05 




Table 6.  U.S. Gas Distribution Hazard Rate by Age (Pipelines Installed 2010-2018) [2] 
Age 
(yr) 








(#/mi/yr) ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 ‘17 ‘18 
0-1 0 1 2 3 4 2 2 2 6 2.444 30,084 8.13E-05 
1-2   0 0 2 2 0 1 2 0 0.875 29,063 3.01E-05 
2-3     0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0.429 28,057 1.53E-05 
3-4       1 2 0 0 1 1 0.833 27,384 3.04E-05 
4-5         0 1 1 1 0 0.600 26,416 2.27E-05 
5-6           1 1 1 0 0.750 24,243 3.09E-05 
6-7             1 0 1 0.667 22,375 2.98E-05 
7-8               2 0 1.000 21,358 4.68E-05 





























Section 3.4:  Consequence Analysis 
Risk matrices were developed based on the average likelihood results 
presented in Section 3.3 and the actual observed consequences (number of fatalities, 
number of injuries, cost, and statistical value) per accident summarized by accident 
cause (Table 8).  However, these average values suggest differences in consequences 
that are misleading because they do not account for the effect of the small number of 
catastrophic accidents. 
For example, the statistical value of each significant reported gas distribution 






Excavation 8.74E-06 Other Incident Cause 2.63E-06
Insufficient Excavation Practices 4.17E-06 Miscellaneous 1.39E-06
Insufficient One-Call Notification Practice 1.99E-06 Unknown 1.24E-06
Insufficient Locating Practices 1.54E-06 Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure 2.43E-06
Other 5.96E-07 Construction Defect 1.09E-06
Previous Damage 3.47E-07 Material Defect 8.44E-07
Abandoned Facility 4.96E-08 Other/Unknown 1.99E-07
Data Not Collected 4.96E-08 Design Defect 1.49E-07
Other Outside Force 7.35E-06 Previous Damage 1.49E-07
Motorized Vehicle/Equipment 4.12E-06 Natural Force Damage 2.08E-06
Other 2.08E-06 Lightning 4.47E-07
Electrical Arcing 6.95E-07 Temperature 4.47E-07
Intentional Damage 2.48E-07 Other 4.47E-07
Previous Damage 1.49E-07 Earth Movement 3.97E-07
Adrift Maritime Equipment 4.96E-08 Heavy Rains/Floods 3.47E-07
Incorrect Operation 2.73E-06 Equipment Failure 1.14E-06
Other 1.74E-06 Control/Relief Equipment Malfunction 4.96E-07
Damage by Operator or Operator's Contractor 4.47E-07 Non-Threaded Connection Failure 2.48E-07
Valve Left or Placed in Wrong Position 1.99E-07 Valve 1.99E-07
Equipment Not Installed Properly 1.99E-07 Other 1.49E-07
Pipeline or Equipment Over-Pressurized 9.93E-08 Threaded Connection Failure 4.96E-08







significant reported accident.  As discussed above, this value represents the amount 
that the public would have been willing to pay to prevent the occurrence and the 
actual costs the operator incurred due to property damage, repairs, emergency 
response, clean-up, and lost product.  This mean value is driven by a relatively low 
number of accidents with catastrophic consequences.  The 10th percentile is 
$129,200; the median is $655,176; and the 90th percentile is $7,350,000.   
Once a reportable event occurs, the resulting consequences will be determined 
by the specific circumstances surrounding the event, and the response to the event 
itself.  Many reportable events do not have the potential to result in catastrophic 
consequences and may not even require an evacuation.  The data needed to determine 
which accidents would have required an evacuation is not available for each 
reportable accident.  However, approximately 40% of the significant gas distribution 
accidents included in this study were considered to be serious accidents, because they 
resulted in at least one injury or fatality.  In other words, 40% of the reportable 
accidents did not successfully remove people from the hazards presented by natural 
gas distribution operations (Figure 10).  It can be difficult to evacuate people prior to 
a natural gas hazard in many scenarios.  For example, if there is an excavation 
accident, there is typically an excavation crew and ignition source near the location 
that the pipe was breached.  However, the consequence data does not show a 
significant difference in statistical value between any of the threats.  Figure 11 shows 
a modified box plot that is used to highlight outliers.  This whiskers on this boxplot 
were constructed by multiplying the interquartile range by 1.5, adding the result to the 





to include the maximum and minimum data points within this range.  All data points 
outside of this range were indicated by circular markers.  The modified box plot is 
used throughout this section. 
Another measure that is often used as an indication of potential gas 
distribution system consequences is the class location.  A gas pipeline’s class location 
broadly indicates the level of potential consequences for a pipeline release based upon 
population density along the pipeline. According to 49 CFR 192.5(a), class locations 
are specified by using a “sliding mile” that extends 220 yards on both sides of the 
centerline of a pipeline.  The number of buildings within this sliding mile at any point 
during the mile’s movement determines the class location for the entire mile of 
pipeline contained within the sliding mile.  Class 1 locations have 10 or fewer 
buildings intended for human occupancy.  Class 2 locations contain more than 10 but 
fewer than 46 buildings intended for human occupancy.  Class 3 locations contain 46 
or more buildings or an outside area that is occupied by 20 or more persons on at least 
5 days a week for 10 weeks in any 12-month period.  Class 4 locations have a 
prevalence of buildings of at least four stories in height.  Class locations are used to 
differentiate some regulatory requirements so that they are commensurate with the 
potential consequences.  The current data shows that the statistical values of accidents 
are similar for each class location, but the more catastrophic accidents may be more 
prevalent in Class 3 and Class 4 locations (Figure 12).   
Similarly, SCADA systems have the potential to significantly reduce the 





indicate that these benefits are being realized (Figure 12).  This information was also 
reviewed for each cause with similar results. 
Other mitigative efforts may help to reduce the consequences of gas 
distribution accidents.  The presence of odorant, excess flow valves, automatic 
shutoff valves, remote-controlled isolation valves, training, and public awareness may 
help to mitigate consequences, but specific data on these factors as they relate to the 






Table 8.  Risk Matrices by Accident Cause for Four Consequence Measurements 
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Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure
Equipment Failure
Other Incident Cause













Figure 10.  Serious and Significant U.S. Gas Distribution Accidents (2010-18) 
 
 








Figure 12.  Statistical Value of Significant Accidents by Class Location and SCADA 
(2010-18) 
 
Section 3.5:  Risk Quantification 
The gas distribution system risk was estimated based on the results of the 
likelihood determination and consequence analysis.  For this evaluation, a point 
estimate was used to estimate the statistical value.  A point estimate is an appropriate 
approximation for this initial framework, but a probabilistic estimate is recommended 
after the consequence analysis development has been completed.  The mean statistical 
value that could be gained if all risks associated with gas distribution systems being 














Excavation $112,529,662 Other Incident Cause $33,886,773
Insufficient Excavation Practices $53,707,339 Miscellaneous $17,902,446
Insufficient One-Call Notification Practice $25,574,923 Unknown $15,984,327
Insufficient Locating Practices $19,820,565 Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure $31,329,281
Other $7,672,477 Construction Defect $14,066,208
Previous Damage $4,475,612 Material Defect $10,869,342
Abandoned Facility $639,373 Other/Unknown $2,557,492
Data Not Collected $639,373 Design Defect $1,918,119
Other Outside Force $94,627,216 Previous Damage $1,918,119
Motorized Vehicle/Equipment $53,067,966 Natural Force Damage $26,853,669
Other $26,853,669 Lightning $5,754,358
Electrical Arcing $8,951,223 Temperature $5,754,358
Intentional Damage $3,196,865 Other $5,754,358
Previous Damage $1,918,119 Earth Movement $5,114,985
Adrift Maritime Equipment $639,373 Heavy Rains/Floods $4,475,612
Incorrect Operation $35,165,519 Equipment Failure $14,705,581
Other $22,378,058 Control/Relief Equipment Malfunction $6,393,731
Damage by Operator or Operator's Contractor $5,754,358 Non-Threaded Connection Failure $3,196,865
Valve Left or Placed in Wrong Position $2,557,492 Valve $2,557,492
Equipment Not Installed Properly $2,557,492 Other $1,918,119
Pipeline or Equipment Over-Pressurized $1,278,746 Threaded Connection Failure $639,373







Section 3.6:  Uncertainty Evaluation 
A listing of the assumptions associated with this evaluation and justification for 
each is shown in Table 10.   
 
Table 10.  Assumptions with Justification 
Assumption Justification 
Gas distribution infrastructure was 
generalized on a per mile basis (e.g., 
changes in design, configuration, and 
location are not considered) 
Appropriate for a nationwide analysis.  
System-specific analyses are recommended 
to support proposed actions resulting from 
this high-level analysis. 
Simplified consequence modeling Data insufficient to support refined 
consequence modeling 
(Recommended Future Work) 
Mean VSL used  VSL values were based on DOT guidance 
which recommended sensitivity study based 
on minimum and maximum values. A 
sensitivity study is included in Section 3.7. 
Integration of all scenarios to 
estimate total risk 
Each cause is treated as mutually exclusive 
in this dataset, although contributing causes 
are known to exist and may be significant. 
(Recommended Future Work) 
Quality of data reported to PHMSA is 
sufficient to support this analysis 
Data quality limitations are discussed herein  
(Recommended Future Work) 
Point estimates were used to quantify 
risk; parameter uncertainty was not 
accounted for. 
Point estimates are an approximation based 
on the maturity of the model at this point.  A 
probabilistic model should be developed 
after data quality and consequence modeling 
has been improved. 







Data Quality Limitations:  Many PHMSA reportable gas distribution accidents are 
investigated by the operators, state regulators (sometimes with support from 
PHMSA), or the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).  The use of 
investigation results to identify meaningful safety improvements within the gas 
distribution industry requires accurate data to be provided in a timely manner.  Table 
11 shows a comparison between the cause information reported to PHMSA and the 
NTSB determined probable cause for gas distribution accidents investigated by the 
NTSB since 2010.  Note that the cause information reported to PHMSA is not 
consistent with the NTSB determined probable cause for the majority of these 
accidents (5/7) which are highlighted in the table.  A similar, more comprehensive 
comparison could be completed with investigation results from the various State 
regulators and/or operators to ensure that the most accurate information is available to 
support analysis and consequential safety decisions.  In some cases, the operator may 
not agree with the probable cause determined by the NTSB, PHMSA, or state 
regulator.  However, the government-led accident investigations generally employ an 
independent assessment of the facts, with input from the operators; they result in the 
most useful cause information for this type of analysis.   
Future work to capture government-led accident investigation results and 
combine this information with the current operator reported PHMSA data could help 
to make the most useful data available for future analysis.  This future analysis could 
then support the identification of performance-based safety enhancements. 





Table 11.  Comparison of Cause Information Reported to PHMSA by the 
Pipeline Operator and the Probable Cause Determined by the NTSB (Accidents with 










9/13/18 9/24/19 Merrimack 
Valley 




8/2/17 12/2/19 Minneapolis MN Pipefitting crew 
disassembled piping 





7/2/17 2/25/19 Millersville PA Improperly installed 




11/16/16 12/3/18 Canton IL Third-party damage 
from directional drilling 
to install underground 
fiber optic conduit 
EXCAVATION 
DAMAGE 
8/10/16 4/24/19 Silver 
Spring 
MD Failure of an indoor 
mercury service 
regulator with an 




3/12/14 6/9/15 New York NY Failure of the defective 
service tee fusion joint 
and breach in the sewer 





12/17/13 3/30/16 Birmingham AL Large crack in 62-year-






Section 3.7:  Sensitivity and Importance Analysis 
Based on the uncertainty evaluation, the need for a sensitivity study to 
evaluate the various estimates of VSL was identified.  In order to assess the 
sensitivity of this analysis to the range of potential acceptable VSLs, the analysis was 
repeated using minimum and maximum values.  The minimum VSL was estimated to 





indicated that the annual statistical value has ranged from $305 million to $376 
million (Table 12). 
In this initial study, data (particularly consequence data) was not available to 
support a full probabilistic risk assessment.  Therefore, the traditional importance 
measures were not calculated.  However, the estimated risk information can be used 
to identify the relative importance of potential cause-based safety program 
improvements.  For example, over 30% of the gas distribution system risk is 
attributed to excavation accidents.  Of these, almost 50% of the risk from excavation 
accidents is associated with insufficient excavation practices, and over 20% is 
associated with insufficient One-Call notification practices.  Similarly, the risk 
contribution of each subcause can be calculated (Table 13).  This shows that 
insufficient excavation practices and motorized vehicle/equipment are dominant risk 
contributors. 
 





Other Outside Force $80,411,151 $94,627,216
Incorrect Operation $29,882,522 $35,165,519
Other Incident Cause $28,795,885 $33,886,773
Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure $26,622,611 $31,329,281
Natural Force Damage $22,819,381 $26,853,669










Table 13. Relative Importance of Subcauses Contributing at Least 1% 
 
 
Section 3.8:  Risk Acceptance 
The gas distribution industry does not have a specific safety metric that they 
are required to meet.  However, the current Administrator of PHMSA has advocated 
for a goal of zero reportable pipeline accidents [11].  A significant change in our 
country’s gas distribution operations would be needed to realize such a significant 
improvement.   
PHMSA’s goal is consistent with an NTSB study, which noted that traditional 
cost-benefit criteria are not necessarily applicable to pipeline accidents because those 






Insufficient Excavation Practices (Excavation) 53,707,339 15%
Motorized Vehicle/Equipment (Other Outside Force) 53,067,966 15%
Other (Other Outside Force) 26,853,669 7%
Insufficient One-Call Notification Practice (Excavation) 25,574,923 7%
Other (Incorrect Operation) 22,378,058 6%
Insufficient Locating Practices (Excavation) 19,820,565 6%
Miscellaneous (Other Incident Cause) 17,902,446 5%
Unknown (Other Incident Cause) 15,984,327 4%
Construction Defect (Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure) 14,066,208 4%
Material Defect (Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure) 10,869,342 3%
Electrical Arcing (Other Outside Force) 8,951,223 2%
External Corrosion (Corrosion) 8,311,850 2%
Other (Excavation) 7,672,477 2%
Control/Relief Equipment Malfunction (Equipment Failure) 6,393,731 2%
Damage by Operator or Operator's Contractor (Incorrect Operation) 5,754,358 2%
Lightning (Natural Force Damage) 5,754,358 2%
Temperature (Natural Force Damage) 5,754,358 2%
Other (Natural Force Damage) 5,754,358 2%
Earth Movement (Natural Force Damage) 5,114,985 1%
Previous Damage (Excavation) 4,475,612 1%





benefit from them.  The NTSB notes that “those who are bearing the risk deserve to 
be protected by expenditures far beyond the dictates of cost-benefit” [12]. 
 
Section 3.9:  Risk Reduction 
The U.S. gas distribution industry has undergone many safety improvements 
over the last two centuries.  Despite many successes and improvements, the industry 
has not yet achieved an acceptable level of risk.  Low frequency, high consequence 
events continue to occur, significantly increasing the overall risk across the industry.   
Many industries use the concept of defense-in-depth to protect against such 
events.  This concept originated as a military strategy where layered lines of defense 
would be used instead of a single strong line of defense.  The use of diverse and 
redundant components can reduce risk by preventing system failure or mitigating its 
consequences.  If failure of the diverse and/or redundant components is detected, 
timely repair of the failed components can be completed without suffering 
catastrophic consequences [33].  
The defense-in-depth concept has been employed in nuclear safety since about 
1957 [33]. In the nuclear safety arena, one acceptable method of supporting risk-
informed safety decisions includes maintaining a defense-in-depth philosophy.  In 
this context, defense-in-depth is considered to include four layers of defense which 
are shown in Table 14 [34].  Although it is not often referred to as “defense-in-
depth,” a similar framework has been employed in the gas distribution pipeline 





implemented in gas distribution systems to date have focused on preventing 
accidents, strengthening the first layers of defense.   
Additional efforts to strengthen the second and third layers of defense could 
yield significant safety benefits.  For example, the NTSB’s investigation of a gas 
distribution accident that occurred on September 13, 2018, in Merrimack Valley, MA 
indicated that the NTSB had previously investigated seven accidents that involved 
natural gas under high pressure entering low-pressure natural gas lines.  A search of 
PHMSA data yielded seven additional accidents that involved over-pressurization of 
a low-pressure distribution system (Table 15).  Analysis of these fourteen accidents 
may have identified a cost-effective safety enhancement to protect low-pressure 
distribution systems from common cause failure (CCF) of their overpressure 
protection system (e.g., worker-monitor regulator valves).  Note that inconsistencies 
in the cause described in the narrative section of these reports and the cause reported 
in the cause field are highlighted in Table 15 (see Data Quality Limitations discussion 
in Section 3.6). 
In order to mitigate these types of accidents before they occur, the information 
must be available, analyzed, and safety improvements must be implemented.  It is 
critical to have a collection of relevant, accurate data available in a useable format 
and representing a broad group of operators.  It is beneficial for this information to be 
collected on a national or international basis so that individual companies are not 
relying on sparse and disparate data.  In the nuclear industry, industry stakeholders 
formed the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) after the Three Mile Island 





Defense-in-depth concepts can be implemented through many different 
structures.  One approach is through the implementation of Pipeline Safety 
Management Systems (PSMS) [35].  Whatever the mechanism, a focus on 
strengthening the second layer of defense can help decrease accident consequences.  
This focus may lead to:  
• Hardware modifications which correct configurations known to have the 
potential for high consequences (e.g., cast iron pipe replacements, installation 
of excess flow valves, diverse overpressure protection for low-pressure 
distribution systems) 
• Implementation of automatic shutoff valves and remote-control valves to 
mitigate the consequences of accidents if they do happen. 
 
Table 14.  Comparison of Layers of Defense Between Commercial Nuclear Safety and 
Gas Distribution Pipeline Safety 
Layers of Defense to Protect Against Low Frequency, High Consequence Events 
Nuclear Safety Gas Distribution Pipeline Safety 
1. Robust design which minimizes 
challenges 
2. Prevention of a severe accident 
3. Containment of hazardous material 
in the event of a severe accident 
4. Protecting the public from a 
release 
1. Robust design, construction, damage 
prevention, and integrity management 
standards minimize challenges 
2. Prevent serious accidents (e.g., operator leak 
monitoring, public awareness programs, 
addition of odorant) 






Table 15.  PHMSA Data Indicating Over-Pressurization of a Low-Pressure 
Distribution System (Excluding NTSB Investigations) 
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OTHER No 0 
4/13/94 Alameda, 
CA 
Regulator and security 
valve failure (may 
have been CCF) 
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Chapter 4: Recommendations for Future Work 
In the U.S. gas distribution industry, many safety improvements have been 
implemented since gas distribution first began.  Some of these improvements have 
been codified and consistently required through regulation and others were 
implemented through industry initiatives and technological advancement.  As the 
industry strives to reduce safety risks further, a set of risk acceptance criteria or safety 
goals should be developed, similar to the risk acceptance criteria used by the nuclear 
industry.  To reach an acceptable level of risk, additional work to understand and 
manage risks is needed.   
As a starting point, the analysis proposed in this thesis should be further 
developed.  In particular, the improvements identified in the uncertainty evaluation 
should be completed, including: 
- Develop a more complete consequence model. 
- Assess the need to consider contributing causes and develop a mechanism 
for incorporating them. 
- Improve the quality of the available data by requiring updates and 
incorporating information from multiple sources. 
- After the data quality and consequence modeling improvements have been 
made, develop a probabilistic model to address parametric uncertainty and 
update analysis to identify and address any new model and completeness 





Additionally, this model should be frequently updated since it relies on historical 
records to predict the future.  Regularly reviewing the model with the goal of 
continuous improvement could provide a way to accurately estimate risk given the 
changing infrastructure and incremental improvements in both operations and data 
quality. 
 Future improvements could be realized by moving towards a proactive, 
predictive approach [36].  Prognostics and health management may also be explored 
for this application that may enhance distribution system safety.  There are examples 
where predictive approaches have improved safety and reliability, while also saving 





Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
 This study utilized PRA methods, nationwide gas distribution system 
information, and operator reported accident data to evaluate gas distribution system 
risks.  Three phases – risk identification, risk assessment, and risk management – 
were completed and could be iterated in the future as knowledge is gained and system 
improvements are made.  The risk identification phase included system 
characterization and threat identification.  The risk assessment phase included 
estimating the likelihood and consequences of those threats that could lead to hazard 
exposure, quantifying the associated risk, evaluating uncertainties, and analyzing the 
sensitivity of assumptions and importance of various risk contributors.  The risk 
management phase included evaluating risk acceptance thresholds and the need for 
risk reduction. 
 There are more than two million miles of main and service lines that distribute 
gas in the U.S., comprised of infrastructure that varies in design, material, 
configuration, and age.  Operator-reported incident reports contain failure cause 
information, each cause was identified as a threat to the system.  Historical data were 
assessed to determine the hazard rate for accidents that occurred between 2010-18.  
The overall hazard curve exhibited a higher hazard rate towards the beginning and 
end of life.  The higher hazard rate early in life was attributed to the following failure 
causes: excavation, other outside force, equipment, and incorrect operations.  These 
causes are typically thought of as being time-independent or stable in the pipeline 
industry.  However, increased construction in the vicinity of new pipelines and 





The increasing hazard rate later in life was attributed to corrosion and natural force 
failures, which is a typical response for degradation mechanisms.  Less mature 
requirements that were in place before 1950 may have also contributed to this 
response for older pipelines.  Initiatives to improve safety performance early in life 
may focus on enhancing existing processes to perform new construction safely, 
expanding public outreach related to new construction projects, and developing more 
robust processes to define and design for actual in-service conditions.  Initiatives to 
improve safety performance later in life may focus on enhancing integrity 
assessments for pipeline that are more than 50 years old, implementing more 
aggressive replacement schedules for pipelines with known integrity challenges, and 
closely collecting, analyzing, and addressing a broad set of performance data. 
Consequences were assessed based on the statistical value of each accident.  
The statistical value was estimated based on the amount the public would have been 
willing to pay to prevent the fatalities and injuries that occurred as a result of the 
accident plus the actual cost incurred.  The mean consequence of $5,754,368 per 
significant reported accident was driven by a relatively low number of accidents with 
catastrophic consequences.   
 The overall risk was estimated based on a point estimate of likelihood and 
consequence due, in part, to the limited data available to support consequence 
analyses.  The mean statistical value that could be gained if all risks associated with 
gas distribution systems were eliminated was estimated to be $358 million per year.  





 The uncertainty evaluation identified several sources of model, completeness, 
and parameter uncertainty which were either justified or recommended for future 
analysis.  Data quality was found to be a significant limitation of this work.  For 
example, the cause information reported to PHMSA and the probable cause 
determined by the NTSB was inconsistent in the majority of cases (5/7).  Similarly, 
cause information summarized from the narrative provided by the operator and that 
reported as the official cause in the same PHMSA form was inconsistent in five of 
seven cases that were not investigated by the NTSB.   
 A sensitivity analysis was performed to address uncertainty associated with 
the use of the estimated VSL.  The results indicated elimination of all risks to public 
health and safety from the U.S. gas distribution system could provide an estimated 
benefit of between $305 million and $376 million per year.   
 Commonly used importance measures were not calculated because this was 
not a full probabilistic risk assessment.  However, the estimated risk information was 
used to identify the relative importance of potential cause-based safety program 
improvements.  When assessing the information at the subcause level, insufficient 
excavation practices and motorized vehicle equipment were dominant contributors.   
 While the industry does not have a specific safety metric, the current gas 
distribution system risks were found to exceed acceptable levels.  The current 
Administrator of PHMSA advocates for a goal of zero reportable pipeline accidents.  
A significant change would be needed to realize such a significant improvement.  
Low frequency, high consequence events continue to occur, significantly increasing 





to employ a defense-in-depth philosophy by focusing on preventing serious accidents 
through mitigation, rather than focusing primarily on preventing system challenges.  
Such an approach may lead to:  hardware modifications to improve configurations 
known to have the potential for high consequences and installing automatic shutoff 
valves and remote-control valves to mitigate the consequences of accidents if they do 
happen. 
 Additional research is needed to develop this approach, to improve accident 
data quality, develop consequence modeling, and consider contributing causes.  Once 
this additional research is completed, this approach can be updated to address 
parameter uncertainty through Monte Carlo simulation using currently available 
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